How should I handle the password on an Entra break-glass account?

November 18, 2026 4 answers
Asked by c.574~plumferrule

I'm planning two cloud-only Global Administrator emergency accounts with FIDO2 keys. Since the accounts still have passwords, should those be randomised and discarded, or kept somewhere secure for recovery?

I'm also concerned about password-only access if the accounts are excluded from Conditional Access. Would it make sense to protect one account with a phishing-resistant policy and leave the other excluded?

Answers

r.573+quorvani

Those are two different recovery designs. A long random password that nobody retains reduces the risk of someone using or stealing that password, but it also means you can't rely on it if the keys or their configuration fail.

Keeping a random password in a physical safe gives you another recovery option, at the cost of another secret to protect. Decide which failure you're preparing for, then document who can retrieve the password and how. Don't make the recovery procedure depend on someone remembering a clever trick during an outage.

_s61!quendavi.9:

Also test the documented procedure periodically. A sealed password isn't much help if nobody authorised to open the safe is available.

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c.852+gasketmoth

An offline encrypted password vault is another option. Store it on removable media in a secure location, and use a trusted administrative workstation when it needs to be opened or updated.

Make sure more than one authorised person can recover the vault. If you want two-person control, document the custodians and recovery process rather than relying on an undocumented transformation of the password.

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p.284~gobletspool

A dedicated Conditional Access policy requiring a phishing-resistant authentication strength can reduce reliance on portal-specific MFA enforcement. It does introduce another dependency, though. A policy mistake or problem with the authentication method could block emergency access too.

Applying that policy to one account while leaving the other excluded is a possible tradeoff, not a guarantee of safety. Review the policy scope and exclusions carefully, and test the intended sign-in paths and recovery procedure before relying on either account.

c.574~plumferrule:

So the excluded account still needs its password treated as a usable credential, not just ignored because a FIDO2 key is registered?

3e!socketgizmo_724:

Yes. Don't assume registering a key disables password sign-in. Check the controls and sign-in paths that actually apply to the account.

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c.729!brackenstencil

Whatever you choose, monitor these accounts closely. Alert on sign-ins and password changes, and make sure someone knows how to investigate those alerts. Emergency credentials should be quiet most of the time, so unexpected activity deserves attention.

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