How should MSPs check for exposure to the ScreenConnect extension issue?

November 18, 2026 4 answers
Asked by Bexi

Huntress linked a campaign affecting 288 endpoints across 48 organizations to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension. It says two versions accepted a blank access key and could bypass normal account authentication.

What should teams check, and how does this change the usual advice about MFA and stolen credentials?

Answers

_c57!plendari.6

Start with an extension inventory, not just an account review. Huntress identified RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 as accepting a blank key. Check whether those versions are installed, whether the extension is enabled, and whether it is still needed.

ConnectWise disabled several third-party extensions in cloud environments, but on-premises operators need to check their own panels. Don't assume a fully patched ScreenConnect installation means every extension is safe.

3q~zivnelo_826:

Also check extensions that were added for a temporary project and never removed. They can be easy to miss in a routine account audit.

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Mivdori+5k

MFA is still worth checking, but it wouldn't address an extension that uses a separate shared key instead of ScreenConnect accounts. Huntress reported endpoint commands without matching login activity, so a clean login history alone doesn't rule out exposure through that route.

The initial access method was still under investigation according to ConnectWise. Treat the RMM+ link as a serious lead, rather than proof that every affected environment was accessed the same way.

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4k+cloverlathe_927

Look for the downstream activity too. Huntress reported use of Run Command, installation of another ScreenConnect client controlled by the attackers, and a toolkit called SCKit. Review endpoint and panel telemetry for those signs if the extension was present.

Removing or disabling an exposed extension addresses the potential entry point. It doesn't automatically remove a client or other tooling that may already have been installed on an endpoint.

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Mivlora+7d

There's a distinction between a flaw in ScreenConnect itself and a flaw in an add-on, but the distinction won't matter much to a customer whose endpoints are affected. An extension with command execution access deserves scrutiny from both its vendor and the team enabling it.

This is also a good reason to review what extensions can bypass normal authentication. An MFA policy only covers the paths that actually use it.

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