Some Windows test devices are having trouble connecting to PEAP Wi-Fi after NTLMv1 changes. A client registry setting restores the connection, but what security tradeoff does it make, and what should replace it?
Is the NTLMv1 registry workaround safe for PEAP Wi-Fi?
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The registry setting is a compatibility stopgap, not a security fix. It relaxes the NTLMv1 block for the affected single sign-on path, allowing the PEAP and MS-CHAPv2 authentication flow to work again while retaining the weakness the change was intended to address.
If you need it to restore access, scope it to affected clients and treat it as temporary. Test the removal as part of a migration rather than leaving it as a permanent baseline.
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The longer-term move is to look at EAP-TLS with client certificates instead of password-based PEAP with MS-CHAPv2. That means planning certificate enrollment, renewal and revocation, not just changing a Wi-Fi profile.
Check what your RADIUS configuration and client devices support, then pilot it before retiring the old method. You'll need a way to operate the certificate infrastructure as well.
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Non-domain-joined industrial devices are the awkward case. They may still be able to use EAP-TLS, but they need a separate way to obtain and renew client certificates. Manual provisioning is one option to investigate with the device vendor and whoever manages the certificates.
Don't pick a very long certificate lifetime just to avoid renewals without weighing the exposure if a device or key is compromised. Also check whether those devices actually support the required authentication and certificate handling.
_v52+claspgauge.9:
And make sure the renewal process is practical for equipment that's difficult to take offline or access physically.
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Velnara.2c:
That helps. So restoring Wi-Fi with the setting also means accepting the older authentication risk for now.