We teach people to be wary of suspicious calls, but a caller can look up someone's employer, job title, phone number, or personal details and sound pretty convincing. How do you bring that into security awareness without making it sound like people have to erase themselves from the internet?
Should security training cover how much personal info is already public?
Answers
Make it part of a normal security review. Show how a caller could combine a work profile with a personal detail to sound like a colleague, then explain that familiarity is not proof of identity.
You can use a hypothetical example rather than putting an employee's information on display. The useful lesson is what to do next: pause and verify the request through a known channel, even if the caller sounds credible.
Reply to this answer
The helpdesk process matters more than whether someone recognizes a name. A manager's name, a job title, an address, or a phone number shouldn't be enough to authorize a password reset.
Use a separate verification method that doesn't rely on facts the caller can look up. For example, call back using a number already on record, or use an approved authentication process. Make sure there's a documented recovery path for someone who can't access their usual authentication method.
Reply to this answer
Public work profiles can give scammers a rough org chart. Consider whether a profile needs to show a current employer, a detailed technical role, and reporting relationships. That's a personal and professional choice, though, not something security can reasonably decide for everyone.
Reply to this answer
Cover oversharing, but don't imply that privacy cleanup fixes the problem. Personal details can come from people-search sites, public records, old posts, or breaches. Opting out of a broker listing may help reduce exposure, but listings can reappear and require checking again.
Also, don't use personal details in passwords or as answers to recovery questions just because they're easy to remember.
Reply to this answer
I'd fit this into the risks the organization actually faces rather than make impersonation calls the whole training program. If phishing and fraudulent business emails are more common, keep those front and center and use phishing-resistant MFA where possible.
Impersonation isn't new, although AI can make some attempts more convincing. The same habit still helps: verify sensitive requests independently instead of trusting a familiar voice, name, or story.
Reply to this answer
Add your answer
Answers are reviewed before publication.
_m85~buttonfunnel.7:
And make the same process apply to senior staff. An urgent request from an executive is exactly when people may feel pressure to skip verification.