How do you stop phishing when users keep giving away passwords and MFA codes?

November 16, 2026 5 answers
Asked by _x56+plumgauge.8

Users keep falling for phishing emails despite training and warnings. Compromised accounts then send the same messages to more people. We use Google for email, on-premises Active Directory, and Microsoft accounts. What has helped reduce this cycle?

Answers

w.351+ferrulecrank

Start by looking at how people sign in, not just what they click. Passwords plus one-time codes or approval prompts can be relayed through a fake login page. The attacker may then get a valid session even though MFA was completed.

Look at phishing-resistant MFA, such as FIDO2 security keys or supported passkeys, for the accounts and services involved. Check the recovery and fallback methods too. A strong primary login won't help much if an attacker can use a weaker fallback.

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9t+bracketspool_462

Put some guardrails around what a stolen account can do. For Microsoft services, conditional access policies that require managed or joined devices can make stolen credentials harder to use from an attacker-controlled device. Limit access by role as well, particularly for admin accounts.

Test the policies with a pilot group and keep emergency access arrangements in mind. Also check coverage separately for Google and any on-premises services. A Microsoft policy doesn't automatically protect every login in the environment, and device restrictions aren't a guarantee against every session theft scenario.

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5d~mapspanner_831

Since compromised accounts are sending the messages onward, work on detection and cleanup as a separate problem. Collect sign-in and mail activity logs, alert on suspicious account behavior and mailbox rule changes, and have a clear process to disable access, revoke sessions, reset credentials, remove malicious rules and find related messages.

Use whatever monitoring or incident response capacity you can support. The goal is to shorten the time between the first compromised account and stopping the next wave.

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3q~parcelwhistle_758

Review the mail filtering too. Check your DKIM and DMARC configuration and whether the current filter catches suspicious links and attachments. You don't have to block all outside mail to improve filtering, although any changes need testing when staff rely on messages from parents.

Keep expectations realistic. A phishing message sent from a genuinely compromised account can come from an address people already trust, so sender authentication alone won't catch everything.

Mavrek+9c:

A simple way to report suspicious mail, with a quick human response, can help staff check a message before acting on it.

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_w61!copperwinder.3

Training isn't automatically useful just because everyone completed it. Try short, relevant examples and simulated phishing exercises, then give people practical follow-up when they miss something. Make reporting easy and avoid treating every mistake as proof someone doesn't care.

Some organizations favor mandatory retraining or management involvement for repeated failures. Whether disciplinary measures are appropriate is a separate decision for leadership and HR, and they may not be practical in every workplace. Either way, users shouldn't be the only defense.

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