I run a computer lab in a residential reentry setting where the shared computers completely reset after each session. That behavior is intentional because people work on resumes, job applications, schoolwork, and other sensitive documents, and nothing should remain for the next user.
The reset process creates a problem with email. Many users already have Gmail accounts, but Google treats every login as a new device and frequently requires a phone verification code. Most users do not have regular access to their personal phones, so checking email becomes difficult. We tried using a staff phone for verification, but Google limits how many accounts can be associated with one number.
For people who need a new address, we tried Tuta, but creating many accounts from the same public IP triggers manual verification that can take up to 48 hours. Email is essential for job applications, employer communication, password resets, resumes, and college applications, and it is also how users keep their resumes available between sessions.
I am not looking to bypass MFA or reduce computer security. I am trying to find a practical, scalable setup that preserves each person's ownership of their account after they leave. Would hardware security keys, passkeys, a managed mailbox system, or a different email provider work better? How do other shared computer labs handle this?
5 Answers
An authenticator app on a staff-controlled work phone may work technically, and some authenticator apps do not impose the same account-count limit as phone-number verification. However, putting many residents’ authentication secrets on one shared staff device creates ownership, privacy, and recovery concerns. It should only be considered with written approval, strict access controls, and a plan to remove the device as a recovery method when each person leaves.
A domain mailbox provider can offer many individual addresses under one organizational account, but it shifts the challenge to administration, storage, and account handoff. Before using one, decide who owns the mailbox, how users export their messages and contacts, what happens when an account is abandoned, and how password-reset messages are protected. The most sustainable solution is probably a managed service combined with hardware keys or passkeys, rather than repeatedly creating free personal accounts from the same network.
Rather than forcing consumer email services to operate like a public kiosk, consider a managed mailbox system for the program. A domain-based service through Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, or another hosted provider would give staff centralized administration, predictable recovery, and policies designed for a managed environment. Users could still keep their personal accounts, while the program mailbox handles applications, resumes, and communication during enrollment. Make sure the data-retention and account-transfer policy is clear before choosing this route.
A managed mailbox would be easier to support, but I’d prefer users to have an address they can keep long-term rather than losing access when they leave unexpectedly.
Hardware security keys such as basic YubiKeys could be a good fit. Each person could register a key with their own account during setup, allowing them to authenticate without having their phone available every time. When someone leaves, the key can be removed from the account and either reset and reassigned or given to the user, depending on your policy. You would need a clear inventory and recovery process for people who leave unexpectedly.
That seems promising because the phone would only be needed during initial setup. My main concern is tracking and reissuing keys with frequent, sometimes unexpected turnover, so I’ll discuss the inventory and ownership process with our IT staff.
If the organization qualifies, nonprofit or government pricing for a managed productivity suite may make this more affordable. Business versions can provide better identity management than free consumer accounts, though I would not rely on an IP allowlist as a replacement for MFA. A shared public IP is still a risky sign-in environment, and disabling or weakening MFA could create a serious account-security problem.
The shared authenticator is exactly what worries me. It would stay with staff, but it could still hold authentication for many personal accounts and make account recovery complicated later.