Our recent security scan flagged our inventory management API as having a critical vulnerability because it uses basic authentication. However, this API isn't publicly accessible at all—it's behind our Application Load Balancer (ALB) and only accepts requests from our order processing service. I provided documentation to the security team proving this setup, and while they acknowledged it, they still insist on fixing it since the scanner marked it as critical. This has led us to spend valuable sprint time moving to OAuth just to resolve what feels like a false positive. Additionally, we have several similar issues, such as a payment webhook receiver only allowing requests from Stripe IPs and Redis endpoints that are strictly VPC-accessible. Meanwhile, real vulnerabilities like overly permissive S3 bucket policies are languishing. Is there a better approach to dealing with these false positive issues in security scans?
4 Answers
Totally agree with the sentiment—every component on your network should have some level of security, regardless of its exposure. Just because something isn’t exposed to the internet doesn’t mean it’s safe, especially with lateral movement risks in a compromised internal environment.
I can’t stand when developers say ‘it doesn’t count’. If the perimeter gets breached, those overlooked vulnerabilities become points of access.
Not being internet accessible doesn't mean it's not a potential vulnerability. You need to ensure your internal security is just as tight as production security. If someone compromises your upstream environment, they could potentially launch a supply chain attack on production. It's essential to document your mitigations thoroughly, so you can communicate them effectively. And honestly, demonstrating that an API is behind an ALB shouldn't take that long if it's clearly mapped out.
Yeah, I've seen similar issues with so-called 'internal' APIs. They can become accessible if there's a breach in your VPN.
Also, if you're not using the same authentication method in staging as you do in production, it's hard to call it a useful testing environment.
Your vulnerability scanner should never have access like attackers do, and if it claims an internal service is exposed without proper checks, that's a flaw on the tool's side. Consider reaching out to your scanner provider for insights into their testing methods.
This might be an opportunity for the industry to improve the context understanding of these tools. We need to work together to prioritize issues based on real risk.
Yep! It's all about combining automated insights with human understanding of the environment.
If a fixer tells you something needs resolving, your response shouldn't be just 'it's not on the internet.' That's a dangerous mindset! Even 'internal' systems are vulnerable if they can be accessed internally by compromised clients. We need to act on these warnings, even if it means dealing with false positives.
One of the most notorious attacks targeted an air-gapped network. It's better to err on the side of caution.
It's probably just a symptom of more lazy practices spreading in the industry, honestly.
Exactly! It’s just one poorly configured rule away from becoming a liability.